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DUE PROCESS AND PUNISHMENT 
"T 0 threaten such a man with J)Unishment," wrote Sir James 
Fitzjames Stephen,1 "is like threatening to punish a man 
for not lifting a weight which he cannot move." 
"No state shall * ~, * deprive any person * * * of life, liberty or 
property without due process of la~v/' are the sonorous words of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The idea which the man in the street would get from the Con-
stitution would probably be epitomized in the phrase "fair play." 
Such an unenlightened person would also doubtless feel that Ste-
phen's supposititious case would be both absurd and palpably unjust. 
And even if he were told that a "comparatively insignificant taking" 
of liberty or property "in aid of what is held by strong and pre-
ponderant public opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary 
to the public welfare"2 would not be a denial of due process of law, 
he would still, perhaps, shake his head in dissent if asked to square 
such punishment with his notion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Modern legislators, courts and jurists-or some of them-seem 
to have no such difficulty. Nowadays we punish men more fre-
quently for not lifting weights which they may not be able to move, 
without permitting them to show, if they can, l:hat they could not 
move them, than for offenses characterized by. some wicked design 
or purpose. And the superiority of the trained judicial intellect 
over the primitive and hopelessly individualistic mind of the com-
mon man is shown by the following argument in support of such 
a policy, which we may put in terms which the wayfarer can not 
fail to understand : 
"You see, the lifting of this weight is a matter of grave public: 
concern; some men can lift it, but if we give them a chance, they 
will pretend that they can not. So we'll just punish everybody who 
fails, on demand, to lift the weight, without regard to ability to 
m9ve it; thus we'll catch the fellow who can, but won't, and insure 
the lifting of the weight; and as for the rest, who perhaps would, 
lH1sT. CR. LAW, Ch. XIX, Vol. 2, p. 172. 
2 Mr. Justice Holmes, in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104. 
DUE PROCESS AND PUNISHMENT 615 
but can't, they have their due process of law in the inspiring thought 
that they have suffered for the common good." 
That there actually is such a doctrine; how it came to exist ; that 
it is pure sophistry and utterly false, and that it is spreading dan-
gerously, so that the basis upon which the true principle is founded 
should be sought for, are the subjects of this paper. 
Let us, for hypothetical purposes, define a "crime" as any objec-
tive occurrence to which the law attaches the consequence of pun-
ishment. "Punishment" we understand as including any corporal 
restraint or infliction so consequentially imposed upon a human 
being, or any pecuniary mulct so exacted from a human being or 
a corporation, the amount of which bears no relation to any pos-
sible valuation of actual or theoretical injury suffered: it may also 
include less usual expedients, such as outlawry, civil death, disfran-
chisement, forfeiture of office, or· even mere official degradation or 
censure--that is, the word is used in its broadest sense. "Law" 
includes the Constitution. 
Are the elements of crime wholly objective? Does the law really 
predicate punishment upon events alone? Or is our conventional 
definition too narrow; and should it include a subjective term? If 
so, what is that term? 
No doubt the mere statement of the questions in this form will 
elicit mental protest on the part of the reader. The classical way 
has been to separate crime into an "act" and an "intent" ; and to 
state the "general rule" in terms of the hoary maxim, "actus non 
reuni ni.si mens reO:' ; following such statement, however, with the 
"exceptions," to the effect that in "statutory crimes," or in some 
classes of offenses othenvise defined, mens rea is or may be dis-
pensed with. Another way of putting the same thing is to say that 
at common law "criminal intent" was an essential element of all 
crimes niala i1i se; but that in creating new offenses, or altering 
the old ones (which is the same thing), the legislature may "do 
away with" this element, and attach punishment to what remains-
the "act."3 Such a statement is, of course, more or less sound his-
torically, and suggests principles that are of service in the interpre-
3 MAY, CR. LAW, Sec. 53; People v. Werner, 174 N. Y. 132; Shevlin-
Carpenter Co. v. Minn., 218 U. S. 57. 
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tation of criminal statutes.4 But it is inadequate as a statement of 
the problem. The "criminal intent" that can be eliminated from 
the predicate of punishment cannot be an element of crime in the 
abstract. It is merely a variable quality found in some of the spe-
cific offenses.5 We are told by some that "criminal intent" and 
"specific intent" are to be distinguished. Analysis tends to show 
either,- . 
I. That all "intent" is "specific," or, · 
2. That it is not true that criminal intent properly defined can 
be eliminated from crime. 
Let us then adhere to our hypothesis and proceed to question its 
correctness as an abstraction, understanding that, for many partic-
4 Lord Kenyon, C. J., in Fowler v. Padget, (17g8) 7 T. R. 509; Cock-
burn, C. J., in Reg. v. Sleep, (1861) 8 Cox C. C. 472, 478; Bramwell, B., in 
Reg. v. Prince, (1875) L. R. 2 C. C. 154; Wills, J., in Reg. v. Tolson, (1889) 
23 Q. B. D. 168, 171; Stephen, J., in s. c., p. 184; Wright, J., in Sherras v. 
DeRutzen, (1895) l Q. B. 918. STEPHEN, HIST. CR. L., Vol. 2, II7. 
Numerous American cases exemplify the rule of statutory interpretation 
in which the influence of the maxim is exerted. See infra, note 6. 
The law has undoubtedly undergone change on this point. No better 
example of the evolution which has taken place has been found than that 
afforded by certain Ohio decisions, all involving statutes from which the 
word "knowingly,'' or its equivalent, has been omitted. Jn Birney v. State 
(1837), 8 Ohio 230, and :Miller-& Gibson v. State, (I854) 3 0. S. 475, the 
omitted words were read into the statute;. this view seems to have been 
wholly supplanted by, that in Farrell v. State, (I877) 32 0. S. 456, and 
Crabtree v. State (I876), 30 0. S. 382, (semble), to the effect that their· 
absence merely shifts the burden of proof as to "scienter" to the defendant; 
(see Com. v. Elwell, (I840) 2 Mete. Igo, I92), then, yielding to the modern 
(or "Massachusetts," vicle Bishop, op. cit., post) view, Ohio v. Kelley (18g6), 
54 0. S. I66 (a pure food case) allowed the inference that the legislature 
meant to eliminate ignorance or mistake entirely. The deterring effect of 
the maxim is plainly discernible in this judicial history. It is interesting 
to note that in the more recent case of Kilbourne v. State, (19n) 84 0. S. 
247, the Ohio supreme court, citing the earliest cases with approval, held 
m1constitutional a statute (having stolen railway property in possession) 
which it felt obliged to construe as eliminating knowledge. It is difficult 
to see why this holding could not have been avoided by following Farrell 
v. State, supra. 
5 Stephen, J., in Reg. v. Tolson, siipra, p. I86; Sir Richard Couch in 
Bank of New South Wlales v. Piper, (I897) A. C. 383, 389; STEPHEN, HIST. 
_CR. LAW, Ch. XVIII, Vol. z, p. 95; ~EDY, INSANITY AND CRIMIN.AI, REsroN-
SIBII.I_TY, 30 HARV. ~- REV. 535, 540. 
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ular offenses, subjective facts-states of mind-are to be added. 
Does the law as a whole-including the Constitution-add any uni-
versal mental element to the objective result as a basis of punish-
ment? 
Innumerable dicta seem to return a negative answer to this ques-
tion in general terms.6 But examination of the case raises a doubt 
6 Among them, the following frequently cited passages may be quoted: 
"I agree that there can be no .crime without a criminal intent; but this is 
not by any means a universal rule. * * * Many statutes which are in the 
nature of police regulations * * * impose criminal penalties irrespective of 
any intent to violate them; the purpose being to require a degree of dili-
gence for the protection of the public which shall render violation impos-
sible." Cooley, J., in People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 579. 
"The validity of the statute is assailed on the ground that it converts 
* * * an innocent act into a criminal offense * * *. The power of the legis-
lature to define and declare public offenses is unlimited except in so far 
as it is restrained by constitutional provisions * * *. It is the province of 
the legislature to determine in the interest of the public what shall be * * * 
forbidden. * * *" Andrews, J., in People v. West, 106 N. Y. 293, 295, 296. 
"While it is an axiom of the law that there can be no crime without 
criminal intent, there are many cases where the execution and enforcement 
of the law demand that the intent be implied * * *· The fact being estab-
lished, the law supplies the element of intent." Chadwick, J., in State v. 
Nicolls, 61 Wash. 142, 145. .· 
"It is declared by St. 1871, c. 83, that no railroad corporation shall * * * 
occupy a highway * * * with cars or engines for more than five minutes at 
one time." 
"The defendant * * * asks the court to rule that there can be no con-
viction, if it is shown that the obstruction complained of was accidental, 
and could not have been avoided or ·removed by the exercise of reasonable 
care * * *· These instructions * * * were properly refused * * *· The 
obstruction complained of is made a nuisance by the statute and is punished 
as such. The prohibition is absolute; it applies expressly to all cases where 
the occupation or use of a highway exceeds five minutes at any one time, 
whether that occupation be reasonable or unreasonable, necessary or unnec-
essary. Knowledge or guilty intent is not an essential element in the com-
mission of the offense***." (Citing Com. v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6 (selling 
contaminated milk); Com. v. Farren, g Allen 48g (selling intoxicating liquor 
to minor.) Colt, J., in Com. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., II2 Mass. 
412, 418. The evidence in. the case showed that a connecting railroad had 
shoved a cut of cars upon defendant's tracks, colliding with defendant's 
cars, so that, in order to move the whole number of cars from the crossing 
within the time limit, it was necessary to move them as one train; and that 
when the attempt to do so was made, the train broke in two near the engine, 
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as to whether or not fundamental issues have been decided or really 
considered in most of them. In order to present the ultimate ques-
tion which is believed to exist, it is necessary to make an important 
distinction. Specifically, it may be admitted that there is not now 
any basis for the assertion that corrupt purpose-i. e., motive, to be 
exact-knowledge of the existence of facts, or knowledge of the 
law are indispensable elements of crime. But it is submitted that 
the elimination of these elements does not logically justify the 
so that more than five minutes elapsed before tbe crossing was cleared. 
Obviously, no question of "guilty knowledge" was involved here; yet the 
.cases dealing with knowledge as an ingredient of the offense are the only 
ones cited. No com;titutional question was raised. See Com. v. N. Y. C. 
& H. R. R. Co., 202 Mass. 394, a case under the same statute, where the 
defense was based upon the unknown malicious interference of third per-
sons in opening the air cocks and setting the brakes. Braley, J., in the 
opinion sustaining a conviction, said (p. 396) : "In statutory offenses cre-
ated in the exercise of the police power, unless a wrongful intent or guilty 
knowledge * * * is made an essential element of the prohibited act, the 
violator may be convicted and punished, even if he has no design to disobey 
the law." Numerous decisions involving "guilty knowledge" are cited. 
"Nothing in law is more incontestable than that, with respect to statu-
tory offenses, the maxim that crime proceeds only from a criminal mind 
does not universally apply." Beasley, C. J., in Halsted v. State, 4r N. J. 
L. 552, 58g. 
"The power of the legislature to declare an offense, and to e.'Cclude the 
elements of knowledge and due diligence from any inquiry as to its com-
mission, cannot, we think, be questioned." Mr. Justice Harlan in C., B. & 
Q. R. Co. v. U. S., 220 U. S. 559. 
The above cases have been selected, almost at random, as instances of 
the careless utterance of dicta or, perhaps, of failure properly to qualify 
statements true as applied to the facts before the court. The Massachusetts 
cases quoted, however, suggest at least the possibility of erroneous results; 
and that such a result is sure to follow the frequent repetition of such loose 
language sufficiently appears from the outrageous decisions in People v. 
Ferriow, 286 Ill. 627, and People v. Johnson, 288 Ill. 442, (i1~fra, note 17). 
On the facts of these cases the respective defendants were culpable enough, 
but the court admitted that the statute applied equally to a possessor of a 
motor vehicle who could have no reason to suspect that the number had 
been. defaced. The old dicta about the immateriality of "knowledge or 
intent" in prosecutions under statutes enacted in the exercise of the "police 
power" were repeated and relied upon to support (as, indeed, they do sup-
port) this extreme result. 
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rejection of the concurrence of will as a condition of punishment.7 
Whether or not ptUlishment can be inflicted upon a person on 
account of an objective detrimental occurrence to which the will of 
the person has in no manner (within the bounds of reason) con-
1 It is believed that the whole difficulty arises from an over-statement of 
a true principle by the commentators of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, followed by a reaction which swung too much the other way. Thus, 
Sm MATHEW liAI.E, in his "PLEAS oF THE CRowN:' Ch. II, says: 
"Man is naturally endowed with these two great faculties, understanding 
and liberty of will, and therefore is a subject properly capable of a law 
* * * and consequently obnoxious to guilt and punishment for the violation 
of that law, which in respect of these two great faculties he hath a capacity 
to obey: The consent of the will is that which renders human actions either 
commendable or culpable; * * * where there is no will to commit an offense, 
there can be no transgression * * * and because the liberty of choice of the 
will presupposeth an act of the understanding to know the * * * action 
chosen by the will, it follows that, where there is a total defect of the 
understanding, there is no free act of the will." 
He was followed by Sm Wrr.LIA:M. BLACKSTONE, in his COMMENTARIES, 
Book IV, Ch. II, wherein he said: 
"All the several * * * excuses which protect the committer of a for-
bidden act from the punishment which is otherwise annexed thereto, may 
be reduced to this single consideration, the want or defect of will. * * * 
To make a complete crime cognizable by human laws, there must be both 
a will and an act. * * * 
"* * * There are three cases, in which the will does not join with the act: 
I. When there is a defect of tmderstandfog. * * * 
2. !11vol1mtary act * * * which is the case of all offenses committed by 
chance or ignorance * * *· 
3. Unwilling act, duress * 0* *·" 
It is believed that there is error in these statements, in so far as mere 
ignorance (or mistake) of fact is treated therein as if it were universally 
the equivalent of lack of intentionality-i. e., the involuntary. It is sub-
mitted that, at the least, some qualification of these portions of the state-
ments quoted is necessary. Yet the error persisted for some time. (See 
JOilL PRENTISS BISHOP, "NEW CRIMINAL LAw," Ch. XIX, passim, particu-
larly§ 303a, note 6; Brett, J., dissmtiente in Reg. v. Prince, L. R. 2 C. C. 
154-a most unfortunate case, on the facts, for the application of such a 
theory; Farrell v. State, s1tpra) ; and in the struggle of ideas which ensued 
the victorious opponents of this confusion of will and knowledge have seem-
ingly taken extreme ground on the other side and repudiated the entire 
principle laid down by HALE and BLACKS'rONE. (See note 6, s1tpra.) 
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tributed, is then the question.8 This question is to be considered 
on the supposition that the legislature has made the attempt by 
enacting language so clear as to overthrow all contrary presump-
tions. It thus ultimately becomes a question of constitutional law. 
Let us take the classical viewpoint and inquire what is an ''act." 
Reflection discloses that an act may be positive or negative. That 
is, that element of crime which, in the classical definition, consti-
tuted its objective part, may consist of something done by a person 
or something omitted· by him. The line between the two, which for 
purposes of convenience will be hereinafter designated as an "act" 
s It may be objected that "will" is an ambiguous term, or that its very 
use in this paper implies an assumption of a false philosophical basis or a 
psychological fact that does not exist-viz., "freedom of the will." It .is 
true that the word "will" or "volition," as it might well be called, defie-s 
exact definition, inasmuch as it is very close to a primary or absolute con-
cept. The description of it given by CHARLES MERCIER in his work, "CRIM-
INAL Rl>sPONSIBILITY;' p. 3r, shows the sense in which the writers use the 
term: "It is felt to be an acti~ity exerted by the whole self-a direction 
of activity, and more than a direction, an exertion, an initiation, an out-
pouring of activity in a certain direction." 
As to the other possible criticism, it is to be admitted frankly that 
freedom of the will has been assumed as an attribute of the "normal" 
human being-i. e., one whose intellectual or moral faculties are not lim-
ited beyond a certain point. The bounds of this paper do not permit dis-
cussion of these points, and such discussion is felt to be out of place for 
the following reasons, none of which could be appropriately demonstrated 
herein: 
(r) The Anglo-Saxon (and, in large part, the continental) jurispru-
dence assumes freedom of the will (many of the citations in this article 
may be brought to the s11pport of this proposition); (2) the decided weight 
of philosophical speculation supports it; (3) the best opinion of modern 
psychologists and criminologists declare its existence in the sense contended 
for; (4) and lastly, if it be rejected, and the determinism of the positivists 
in criminology (see loMBROSO, "CRIM:E, ITS . CAUS:ES AND R:EM:EDms") be 
accepted completely in lieu of it, the effect would be, it is submitted, to 
destroy the whole system of criminal law, and to substitute in its place a 
scheme of social control of what we now call "crime" based upon the prin-
ciple of clinical treatment of the "criminal" or correction of his environ-
ment, which would be the utter antithesis of "punishment'' as we have 
defined it. In other words, it is felt that as freedom of the will is basic 
to criminal jurisprudence, we must necessarily assume its existence. As 
SALMOND says (JURISP., § 128), "as to the nature· of the wilL and the control 
exercised by it, it is not for lawY-ers to dispute, this being a problem of 
psychology or physiology, not of jurisprudence." 
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and an "omission," is somewhat difficult to draw. Yet it is clear 
enough that it exists. 
Take the "act" proper. Can it take place without the concurrence 
of the will? In an effort to reduce it to its lowest terms it has 
been defined as a voluntary muscular contraction.9 Can it be less 
than that? Suppose there is a motion of the ·body without a vol-
untary muscular contraction. This may come about in several ways 
-i. e., somnambulism, hypnotism, volitional insanity ("irresistible 
impulse"), coercion, etc. Or suppose the objective result inter-
dicted has come about through the "act of God" or an inevitable 
accident; can it be imputed to the defendant as his "act" because 
he may have been engaged at the time in some particular enterprise, 
or because he sustained some relation, as that of owner, to the 
physical thing wrought upon by causes to which his will did not 
contribute in such a way as to produce the result which constitutes 
the objective element of a crime? 
Greater difficulty is encountered in stating the question as to the 
relation of the will to an "omission" in terms consistent with the 
classical point of view. Yet this way of putting it may be hazarded: 
Can a person be charged criminally with the consequences of failure 
to act-i. e., to exercise his will and thus to put in 'motion forces 
calculated to bring about the result commanded, when he is able 
to show that he actually did, in good faith, exercise his will to the 
end desired, but his efforts were frustrated by extraneous causes 
wholly beyond any control that it was physically possible for him 
to exert (unless "physical possibility" be given an absurdly extreme 
9 "An. act, it is true, imports intention in a certain sense. It is a mus-
cular contraction, and something more. A spasm is not an act. The con-
traction of the muscles must be willed." Hor.MES, "THI~ Co11n.rnN LAw;' 
p. 54- See also p. 91. 
"By 'events' jurists mean those occurrences which take place independ-
ently of human wills. By 'acts' they mean those which are subject to the 
control of the human will and so flow therefrom. Acts, then, are exertions 
of the will manifested in the external world." POUND, "RtADINGS ON THE 
HISTORY AND ·SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW,'' p. 453. 
"The term act is ambiguous * * *· When it is said, however, that an 
act is one of the essential conditions of liability, we use the term in the 
widest sense of which it is capable. We m~n by it any event which is sub-
ject to the control of the human will." SALMOND, ]URISP., § 128 (but see 
§ 132-discussion of mens rea). 
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meaning) ? Or even that,· though he did not so exercise his will, 
circumstances were such that any attempt on his par~ to do so would 
have been fruitless? 
It is well said that the creation of crimes is an exercise of the 
police power-the state's right of self-defense. Is it not funda-
mental to the exercise of this power that legislation to this end be 
expressed in the form of prohibition or of command? Do we not 
speak accurately in common parlance when we speak of "violating" 
or of "complying with" the law? Are not the words of the Deca-
logue-"thou shalt" and "thou shalt not"-most finely expressive 
of the "compulsion" and "restraint" which are said to be the fun-
damental methods of the police power ?10 
In short, from the standpoint of constitutional law, can the state 
punish for less than a violation of its commands or prohibitions; 
and are not those commands and prohibitions addressed to the will? 
Do we not, by the criminal law, regulate concfuct;·and can there be 
conduct without either positive will or the lack of it where it could 
be effectual ? 
Two distinct reactions to the statements of the question which 
have been made are likely. Some will say that the whole inquiry 
comes too late, in that the plenary power of the legislature to create· 
crimes and punish them is now too firmly established to be shaken. 
These ·will have in mind the pure food and liquor cases and others 
of similar character. Others will conceive of our extreme state-
ments as men of straw, easy to knock over, but having no real exist-
ence: An answer to both objections alike is found on the one hand 
in numerous cases and writings which seem, at least, to assert a 
doctrine as extreme as that which we have paraphrased at the begin-
ning of this paper; and on the other hand in a smaller number of 
cases wherein a line has been drawn and the Constitution expressly 
or impliedly applied,11 and in some well-considered articles and 
10 FREUND, PouCJ> PowtR, § 3. 
11 Kilbourne v. State, 84 0. S. 247 (having stolen railway property in 
possession) ; State v. Strasburg, 6o Wash. I06 (act abolishing defense of 
insanity) ; State v. Kartz, 13 R. I. 528 (being the owner of a place having 
the reputation of a "speak easy") ; see State v. Beswick, id. 2II ; compare 
the decision of the same learned judge (Durfee, Ch. J.) in State v. Smith, 
10 R. I. 258; State v. Divine, 98 N. C. 778. 
In State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, the defendant was convicted of an 
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opm10ns in which the possibility of the existence of such a line 
has seemingly been recognized.12 It is submitted that if the con-
offense purely "statutory" from which "knowledge" and "intent" had been 
eliminated to the usual extreme degree; but the offense had been committed 
after the supreme court of the state ha.d held the statu_te unconstitutional 
and before this decision had been overruled by a subsequent case sustaining 
the law. The entire court concurred in reversing the conviction, though 
the judges did not agree among themselves. The prevailing opinion was 
written by McClain, J. In it he said (p. 522), ·~mere ignorance of the law 
does not excuse, and even ignorance of fact which the statute, expressly 
or impliedly, makes it the duty of one acting in reference to the subject-
matter regulated by the statute to know, and with reference to which he is 
required to act at his peril, will not excuse him. B1tt eve1i as to these 
strict mles there are necessary esceptions.'' (Italics ours.) 
12 See report of committee of Am. Instit. of Criminal Law and Crim-
inology, 2 JouR. CRn.r. LA.w AND CR!MINOI.OGY, 532, (but the question is 
ignored by the chairman, Professor Keedy, in his articles in 30 HARV. L. 
R.ev. 535, 724-
Prof. John R. Rood, though severely criticising State v. Strasburg in 
9 MICH. L. Rnv. Iz6, says (p. I33), "there may be a line that should be 
drawn." 
WILI,IA:r.r LAWRENCE Cr.ARK in I6 CoRP. JuR. I, 78, title "Criminal Law," 
treatiug of "intent" (as an element of) "acts prohibited by statute," after 
stating the "exception to the rule" in the usual way, says: "But the rule 
applies only to unlawful acts which. are voluntarily, and in this sense inten-
tionally, done." For this, he cites Louisville R. Co. v. Com., I30 Ky. 738, 
where there is at least a dict11m to that effect. 
In the same context, Mr. Clark gives the Strasburg case as authority 
for this statement: "It has been held, however, that the police power of 
the state, even though broad enough to authorize the legislature to elimi-
nate the element of intent in defining crime, is not without. limitations, and 
that a penal law will not be valid where it makes criminal an act which the 
utmost care and circumspection would not enable one to avoid." 
In U. S. v. K. C. S. R. Co., 202 Fed. 828, 833, Van Valkenburgh, J., 
speaking of a proviso in the hours of service law excusing the carrier 
"where the delay is the result of a cause * * * which could not have bee11 
foreseen,'' said, "by this act it is sought to prevent railroad employees from 
working consecutively longer than the period prescribed, as completely and 
effectively as could be accomplished by legislaJion" (italics are the present 
writers'). But the act might have had no proviso whatever, and might have 
clearly excluded any and all defenses. Would this have been going further 
than "could be accomplished by legislation?" 
Church, Ch. J., in Gardner v. People, 62 N. Y. 299, after stating the 
classical "rule and exception," said, "the act prohibited must be intention-
ally done. A mistake as to the fact of doing the act will excuse the party, 
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stitutions do establish limitations on the police power of the legis-
latures in the creation of crimes and the imposition of punishments, 
the tendencies of present-day legislation make it worth while to 
attempt a definition of such limitations, however infrequently in the 
past the courts may have felt called upon to apply them. 
Brief reflection will disclose" the existence of at least one obvious 
limitation on ·the exercise of the police power in the creation and 
punishment of statutory crimes. That is the limitation inherent in 
the very nature of the power itself, or, more accurately, that imposed 
universally upon its exercise by the "due process" clause of the fed-
eral Constitution and similar provisions of the bills of rights of 
the state and federal constitutions. Infring~ments of liberty and 
property rights of the individual plainly and palpably unjustified 
by any public necessity are theoretically prohibited by such consti-
tutional provisions, however liberal the present attitude of the courts 
may be toward the existence of such public necessity in particular 
cases. And if necessity as a justification be a matter of degree, it 
would seem that the stigma of crime and punishment should be 
regarded as the most drastic of the methods of the police power, 
and therefore as requiring a clearer showing of necessity as a justi-
fication than might support less harsh methods of the exercise of 
that power: some of the cases may be explained on this ground 
alone.13 
but; if the act is intentionally done the statute declares it a misdemeanor, 
irrespective of the motive or intent." 
Compare Bruhn v. Rex, (1909) A. C. 317, an extreme case, which, for 
:reasons hereinafter to be developed, is not in point on the theme of this 
paper, but illustrates finely the tendency of modern "regulatory" legislation. 
The case, however, is consist~nt with the principle by which the criminal 
•• liability of a master for the acts of his servants is sustained. 
1 3 A comparison of the criminal with the civil cases reveals the rather 
astonishing fact that the courts are much more inclined to apply the lim-
itations of the due_ process of law clauses to legislative acts imposing civil 
than to those imposing criminal liability. It would seem that the opposite 
ought to be the rule, for surely the imposition of a criminal sentence is or 
may be far more oppressive upon the individual than the imposing of a 
civil liability. If, for example, the state has no power to make a railway 
company liable civilly for all cattle killed by its trains, regardless of fault, 
25 L. R. A. 162, note; 35 L. R. A. n. s. 1018, note, or an owner of an auto-
mobile liable for all damage done by his car when driven by another, if that 
other be a trespasser, Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371 (but see Hawkins 
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Let us assume, then, that a certain event is so detrimental to the 
public welfare that the exertion of the police power to the utmost 
degree possible is f ustified for its prevention. By this assumption 
we lay on one side all questions as to the power to control human 
conduct, including the acquisition, use and dispositiqn of things, 
and, in the absolute sense, all question as to the power to choose 
punishment as a method, by way of sanction for the commands or 
prohibitions laid upon individuals by the law to be enacted. Can 
such a law constitutionally declare that such punishment shall be 
inflicted upon a person, if the offensive thing occurs, thereby 
making such person an insurer, at the risk of such punishment, 
against the occurrence? Some of the cases would seem to say yes, 
if the person be engaged in the commission of an act of which the 
offensive objective fact is a concomitant. The act is said to be done 
at peril. At peril of what? Obviously, at peril of the existence of 
the fact which forms the real basis of punishment. Thus, in the 
sale of adulterated food, the "act" is really a sale of something for 
use as food. It is false to think or to speak of the adulteration as 
a part of the act. It is merely a concomitant fact, the presence of 
which makes the act itself, which would otherwise be innocent, 
punishable.14 But the act proper-the selling of food-is, under 
v. Ermatinger, 211 Mich. 578), or a railway company liable for funeral 
expenses in cases of all persons killed by its trains, Ry. v. Lackey, 78 Ill. 55, 
or an owner of land liable for all damage done by the escape of fire from 
his premises, Eastman v. Logging Co., 69 Ore. 1, or an owner of logs for 
logs floating in river without being rafted where not voluntarily so set loose, 
Craig v. Kline, 65 Pa. St. 413; then surely there must be some limitation 
upon the power of the state to make criminal the happening of the same or 
similar events. It is the conviction of the writers that the allocation of the 
burden of an actual loss is one thing, and the imposition of punishment is 
another, however confused and intermingled the two may have been eight 
hundred years ago. Therefore, civil liability without fault might be sup-
ported without justifying punishment without fault. (For discussion as to 
whether or not the tendency in tort law is toward or against the doctrine 
of liability without fault, see article by Dean Pound in 27 HARV. L. REv. 
233, and articles by Professor Jeremiah Smith. in 33 HARV. L. REv. 542, 667; 
Professor Whittier in 15 HiARv. L. REv. 335; Professor R. M. Perkins in 5 
IOWA L. B. 86.) 
14 Sn>PHEN, "DrGJ;S'l' oF CRIMINAL LAw," p. 20, art. 34. refers to the 
incriminating fact in this class of cases as "an independent act"-i. e., inde-
pendent of the "act of the offender." The learned author's meaning may 
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the statute, done at the peril of the existence of adulteration in the 
food product sold.15 In a very true sense, the actor must avoid the 
punishment by positive precautions rather than by forbearance. It 
is assumed that the retailer can take such precautions with effect-
i. e., test every article before selling it, so discover the adulteration, 
if present, and thus avoid punishment ·by not selling. If he neglects 
this onerous task, or even if he performs it imperfectly, he wills 
. the unknown consequence by consciously acting in indifference to 
it; he "takes a chance."16 
have included "independent event." In either sense it is clear that anything 
that is "independent" of an ·act can be no part of it. Compare Stephen, J., 
in Reg. v. Serne, 16 Cox C. C. 3n, limiting the old definitions of "construc-
tive murder." 
15 The instances of the use of this phrase are, of course, very numerous. 
As remarked by Rugg, J., in Com. v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 146, in an able 
opinion citing many Massachusetts cases in which the principle of action 
at peril was involved, a striking analysis of it has been attempted by Holmes, 
J., in Com. v. Smith, 166 Mass. 370, 375-6: "The statute means that people 
enter such place (gambling houses) at their peril. * * * When, according to 
common experience, a certain fact generaily is accompanied by knowledge 
of the further elements necessary to complete what it is the final object of 
the law to prevent, or even short of that, when it is very desirable that 
people should find out whether the further elements are there, actual knowl-
edge being a matter difficult to prove, the law may stop at the preliminary 
fact, and in the pursuit of its policy may make the preliminary fact enough 
to constitute a crime." Yet even to this statement the writers are obliged 
by their analysis to take exception. Selling food is the "preliminary fact." 
Adulteration is the "further element" to be prevented. The law does not 
make the former an offense unless accompanied by the latter. A simpler 
statement of the principle is found in 3 GRESNL. Evm., § 21 : "The law in 
these cases seems to bind the parties to know the facts, and to obey the law 
at their peril." 
16 Com. v. Farren, 9 Allen (Mass.) 48g, (watered milk) is probably the 
leading American pure food case. In it Chapman, J., said (p. 490) : "One 
of the reasons which induced the legislature ** was that they * * * regarded 
it as reasonable under all' the circumstances that the seiler * * * take upon 
himself the risk of knowing that the article he offers for sale is not adul-
terated * * *. If the legislature deem it important that those who seII * * * 
shaII be held absolutely liable, notwithstanding their ignorance of the adul-
teration, we can see nothing unreasonable in throwing this risk upon them." 
"Such an emergency may justify legislation which throws upon the seiler 
the entire responsibility of the purity and soundness of what he sells and 
compels him to know and to be certain." Finch, J., in People v. Kibler, 106 
N. Y. 321 (watered milk). 
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It is, therefore, possible to support the principle of action at peril 
in the criminal law on strictly logical grounds perfectly consistent 
with the necessity of the concurrence of the will. But lest we 
encounter. pitfalls here, it should be pointed out that too great lib-
erties may easily be taken with the "act" in order to apply this 
doctrine. Selling is an act, to be sure. Likewise operating or 
driving a vehicle, or navigating a ship, or running a railroad train, 
or conducting a manufacturing enterprise. And we are still within 
the principle of volition when we charge a master criminally for the 
consequence of the conduct of his servants, though prohibited by 
him. If the master is content with mere directions to his servant, 
which conceivably may be violated, he consciously assumes the risk 
of such violation and the result becomes voluntary as to him in this 
sense. On the other hand, however, it is submitted that "action" 
cannot be stretched to cover mere static conditions, such as posses-
sion, ownership, relationship and the like. Here the police regula-
tion can only command prevention of the objectionable occurrence 
or abatement of the detrimental condition; the owner, proprietor, 
etc., may be forbidden to "permit," or to "suffer" the occurrence of 
the thing. But he cannot be punished if it happens against his 
will, actively asserted to the utmost degree within reason. . He may 
be called upon to act, but not punished for things that happen with-
out the causation of his failure to act.17 
"The means which dealers in these products generally have of informing 
themselves as to the substance of which they are compounded are so ample 
that but few will suffer same through design or negligence, while no prac-
ticable degree of caution would protect purchasers; and it is manifest that 
the legislature has thought proper to incur the slight risk of injustice to the 
few in order to escape the greater risk of injustice to the many." Dixon, 
J., in State, Waterbury v. Newton, 50 N. J. L. 534. 537 (artificially colored 
oleomargarine). Similar expressions are found in Com. v. Waite, 11 Allen 
(Mass.) 264; State v. Schlenker,' II2 Iowa 642, 5I L. R. A. 347. 
Some one of the above expressions is employed, with slight variation, 
in State v. Kelly, 54 0. S. r66, r8o; Com. v. Weiss, r39 Pa. St. 247; People 
v. Snowberger, II3 Mich. 86; Groff v. State, I7I Ind. 547; State v. Maurer, 
255 Mo. r52, r68. 
17 Yet such a case has actually happened, and though the constitutional 
point presented herein was raised, it was brushed aside without much con-
sideration on the authority of the misleading dicta which have been men-
tioned. See People v. Fernow, 286 Ill. 627, and People v. Johnson, 288 Ill. 
442, in which cases it; was declared to be within the "police power" of the 
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Moreover, we may return to the principle of action at peril to 
point out that there is a limitation inherent in the idea of the "peril" 
indicated by the statement of it. If the analysis herein attempted 
is sound, the gist of the offense in cases of action at peril is really 
omission; the actor is punished rather for something he fails to 
prevent or to discover than for something he does. Must not the 
objectionable occurrence be preventable or the objectionable fact 
discovera:ble by him? There are concessions in the cases indicating 
that judges have been troubled by this question, and some decisions 
squarely based on an affirmative answer thereto.18 Yet the author-
state to punish a man for having in possessio1i a motor vehicle the manu-
facturer's serial number on which had been defaced, though it might be 
that the defacement consisted of alterations impossible of detection, and 
had been made by another without any human possibility of knowledge on 
the part of the accused. The commentator, on page 1540 of 4 A. L. R., 
after abstracting the decisions relied upon by the Illinois court, says, "it 
will be seen that these cases are all cases of affirmative acts. * * * The elim-
ination of criminal intent, while reasonable enough in some cases, is full of 
danger to the accused, even in cases where the statute punishes affirmative 
acts, and ought to be strictly limited in a day when the doctrine of the pre-
sumption of innocence has become unpopular. * * * A statute under which 
an innocent person, who does nothing, may be turned into a criminal by the 
act of another, for which he is not responsible, is startling to old-fashioned 
ideas. Under the Illinois statute, * * * what is the innocent owner of an 
automobile to do, who finds in the morning that the manufacturer's number 
0£ his car has been mutilated in the night? Is he to give himself up to the 
police as a criminal? Is he at once to destroy his car? Is there any way 
in which he can escape? It seems that he may even be apprehended before 
he knows of the mutilation." 
The only answer found in the opinion of the court to these questions is 
as follows: 
"Laws cannot be held invalid merely because some innocent person may 
possibly suffer. The principle of police regulation is the greatest good to 
the greatest number." How it could bring "good" to anybody to punish a 
man under these circumstances is not explained. (For a somewhat similar 
holding, considerably qualified, however, see Ford v. State, 85 Md. 465.) 
But the maxim of Bentham is misapplied; or else the police power must be 
redefined as the power to commit admitted injustice for the purpose of 
accomplishing some alleged public good, regardless of the appropriateness 
of the means to the end. Can such a definition be correct? 
is See, generally, cases cited supra, notes II, 12. In Com. v. N. Y. C. & 
H. R. R. Co., 202 Mass. 394, an extreme case the other way (see facts, 
abstracted supra, note 6), Bradley, J., said (p. 398), "no argument has been 
advanced, nor was there any proof at the trial, that by competent super-
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ities generally either ignore it or stretch the theory of preventability 
or discoverability beyond all reason.19 The pure food cases, repre-
senting as they do an absolute unanimity of decision, would seem 
to go to the very verge, if not beyond it, in their dicta.20 They say, 
at least inferentially, that the fact of adult~ration in the food sold 
could be discovered by analysis; but analysis of the contents of each 
separate container would be necessary. This, it is submitted, is 
an absurdly high degree of diligence. If within the bounds of 
vision, even if necessarily required to be more or less constant, the defendant 
would not have been able to have prevented the mischief caused by the ' 
intermeddlers." See also International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. 
s. 216. 
19 Observe the language of Cooley, J., in People v. Roby, quoted supra, 
note 6: "The purpose being to require a degree of diligence for the pro-
tection of the public which shall render violation (sic) impossible." What 
the learned judge meant was, doubtless, that the degree of diligence required, 
if exerted, would render the objectionable event impossible. This raises the 
query as to whether the legislature can, under the Fourteenth Amendment, , 
assume that human diligence is capable of detecting or of preventing abso-
lutely a given deleterious happening, as against a possible showing of fact, 
in a given case, that such diligence at its best (a limited best, of course) 
was not or could not be capable of such efficiency. See the Massachusetts 
and Illinois cases referred to in notes 6 and: 17, supra; also Com. v. Grau-
stein, 209 Mass. 38; cases cited note 16, supra. 
20 See cases cited' supra, note 16. All of these cases seem right as far 
as the actual decisions therein are concerned. In none of them was there 
a defense of excusable want of knowledge-i. e., knowledge that it would 
have been utterly impracticable for the defendant to obtain; nor of for-
tuitous event, wholly beyond his control. But the dicta quoted would exclude 
such defenses, and such cases are by no means fanciful. See Brown v. Foot, 
17 Cox C. C. 509; Jones v. Bertram, 58 J. P. 478 (adulteration by malicious 
act of third party; held no defense); Parker v. Alder, (1899) l Q. B. 20 
(adulteration while in transit in hands of carrier after leaving possession 
of defendant; held no defense). Of course the British parliament is not 
limited to "due process of law." Again, the early cases afforded little pos-
sibility of raising any real issue. In none of them was the test made by 
the prosecution to establish the fact of adulteration impracticable for the 
defendant. But today many foods are sold in sealed packages. If a retailer 
should open a package for testing purposes its value would be destroyed; 
and he must test every package if he is to be absolutely sure. See Com. v. 
Mixer, 207 Mass. 141. In Adams Express Co. v. Com., 129 Ky. 420, the 
right of a carrier to inquire into the contents of a package and then to find 
out whether or not it contains contraband liquor was assumed to be a nec-
essary predicate of fastening criminal liability upon it. 
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physical possibility, it is so in a purely academic sense. But even 
the approval of the erection of such a standard of conduct falls 
~hort of establishing that criminal liability may constitutionally be 
predicated upon the happening of what it would have been literally 
impossible to prevent. Occurrences theoretically preventable may, 
nevertheless, be practically unavoidable; and when so, the public 
necessity of casting upon persons the duty of exercising extreme 
care to prevent them cannot ·be stretched so as to make them insurers 
against the events, even when such occurrences are possible con-
comitants of positive action which may be "regulated" under the 
police power. 21 
At the risk of breaking the thread of the argument, brief notice 
may be taken of the philosophical basis of punishment. It is 
believed that the numerous theories which have been put forth from 
time to time are reducible to four principles. Punishment is vari~ 
ously said to be based upon (r) vindication, (2) retribution, (3) 
reformation, or ( 4) prevention (or repression). The first two of 
these have not been considered, for our constitutional theories of 
"due process of law" have never taken them into account. Refor-
mation is ex h31pothesi, a process of moulding the will. Prevention 
alone seems objective in its outlook; that is, it seems to regard the 
avoidance of a detrimental result as the end of the law, and pun-
ishment as the means of its attainment. Suppose we accept pre-
vention as a sound philosophical basis for punishment. It is cer-
21 See notes II, 12, and 18, siepra. 
In International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 223, Mr. 
Justice H
0
olmes. said: "If business is to go on, men must unite to do it and 
must sell their wares. To compel them to guess on peril of indictment what 
the community would have given for them if the continually changing con-
ditions w~re other than they are, to an uncertain extent; to divine prophet-
ically what the reaction of only partially determined facts would be upon 
the imagination and desires of purchasers, is to exact gifts that mankind does 
not possess" (holding Kentucky anti-trust law-constitutional and statutory 
-to be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
See also prevailing opinion of McClain, J., in State v. O'Neil, supra, 
note II. People v. Cipperly, IOI N. Y. 634 (adopting dissenting opinion of 
Learned, J., in 37 Hun 324) may be thought to be a decision squarely 
opposed to the text. It is not so, however, as an examination of the case 
will show. People v. Johnson, 288 Ill. 442, and People v. Fernow, 286 Ill. 
627, supra, note 17, are opposed to the text. 
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tainly the ground most frequently, if not always, taken in justify-
ing an exercise of the police power. There must, nevertheless, be 
a perceptible and legitimate relation of the means to the end if our 
constitutions are to have any meaning at all. For if the infliction 
of the punishment is justified on the ground that it will tend to 
discourage and thereby to prevent the happening of the event sought 
to be guarded against, and no standard by which such tendency 
may be established is set up, but the legislature is made the final 
judge thereof, the consequences are startling. 
The favorite reason for excluding the defense of want of knowl-
edge in the pure food cases is that in no other way cpuld the public 
be protected against adulteration.22 The idea of the relation of 
means to a preventive end is here perfectly patent. It would seem 
most obvious that sellers will be spurred to the exercise of the 
extreme diligence which the law requires by the knowledge that 
proof -of their ignorance of the fact of adulteration would be futile 
in a prosecution. The exercise of that degree of diligence will tend 
to prevent the evil aimed at. 
But may not even this application of the principle be illegiti-
mately made? For example, can we argue from this that punish- -
ment can be justified in all cases by the mere fact that the tbought 
of the penalty and the hopelessness of avoiding it will terrify men 
22 "It is of the greatest importance that the community shall be pro-
tected against the frauds now practiced so extensively and skillfully in adul-
teration." Chapman, J., in Com. v. Farren, 9 Allen 489, 490. 
"Experience has taught the lesson that repressive measures which depend 
for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge * * * are of little 
use and rarely accomplish their purpose." Finch, J., in People v. Kibler, 
100 N. Y. 321, 324-
"The object was * * * to prevent acts which in their results operated 
unjustly upon others. This object would be thwarted if sales could be 
made with impunity by those ignorant of the ingredients of the articles sold." 
Dixon, J., in State, Waterbury v. Newton, 50 N. J. L. 534, 537. "It is a 
plan devised by the general assembly to protect the public against the hurt-
ful consequences of the sales of adulterated foods, those consequences being 
in no degree increased by the vendor's knowledge, or diminished by his igno-
rance, of the adulteration * * *· It would have been inconsistent with that 
purpose to provide for the trial of such immaterial issues as * * * the extent · 
of his knowledge * * *." Shauck, J., in State v. Kelly, 54 Oh. St. 166, 178. 
See Com. v. Weiss, 139 Pa. St. 247; II L. R. A. 530; dissenting opinion of 
Earl, J., in People v. Arensberg, 103 N. Y. 388, 394-
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and women into an observance of the laws? Thus, could the abo-
lition of the defense of alibi be likewise justified? Of courst not, 
one says. That would be absurd; because alibi consists of proof 
that the defendant did not commit the crime at all, and you cannot 
constitutionally punish a man for a crime he did not commit. To 
which it may be replied that there is no perceptible difference 
between punishing a man for a criminal act he did not commit and 
punishing him for the happening of an event which he did not will 
and could not prevent as a criminal act which he did commit. 
Again, one must concede that the punishment of all the members 
of the family of the principal offender as accessories would have a 
theoretical tendency to prevent crime by inciting persons to watch-
fulness over the conduct of members of their families. Would 
such a law be constitutional in the United States, however consist-
ent with primitive law it may be ?23 It is submitted that the justi-
fication of punishment on the basis of prevention goes no further 
than this: punishment may be imposed for a voluntary act, because 
it will deter other like voluntary acts.; it may be imposed for omfa-
sion to act when the omitted action is possible and would prevent 
the evil, because it will stimulate the desired action. But it cannot 
be imposed because of a mere occurrence, coupled with a static con-
dition which has no causal connection with the occurrence, because 
it will not prevent either the condition or the occurrence; it cannot 
be imposed because of a mere occurrence, coupled with an act or 
omission itself lawful, for the same reason. 
It may be desirable here to take note briefly of a collateral ques-
tion. It is sometimes intimated that a defense may be taken away 
on the sole ground that it is easy to simulate and hard to refute 
when simulated. M Is this true? If so, there must be boundaries 
2s See F. W. MAI'l'I,AND, "Tm; CRIMIN.AI, LrABII.I'.rY oF 'tHE HUNDRED," 
1 Cor.r.EC'l'ltl> PAPERS, 230. The wergild, the blood-feud, and other primitive 
institutions were manifestly not punishments-see MAI'.rI.AND, "THE KINDRED 
AND '.rHE BLOOD FEUD," id. 202, 217. 
24 "One of the reasons which induced the legislature * * * undoubtedly 
was that they regarded it as impracticable in most cases to prove the knowl-
edge." Chapman, J., in Com. v. Farren, 9 Allen "489, 490. 
"Purpose and knowledge, except when they are indicated by the char-
acter of the forbidden act, are in most cases insusceptible of proof. If this 
statute had imposed upon the state the burden of proving the purpose 0f 
DUE PROCESS AND PUNISHMENT 
within which such a principle is confined. For, obviously, the surest 
method of convicting a person charged with crime is to presume 
him guilty on proof of the corptts delicti, and admit no defense 
whatever. This would be, of course, an absurdity. Yet it is capable 
of being supported on the theory under discussion, if we admit that 
the legislature, in order to prevent a given class of detrimental 
occurrences, may "deprive" persons charged with bringing them 
about of a "defense" because of the difficulty of refuting it, so as 
to insure efficie* enforcement of the law. It is believed that there 
can be no deviation from the principle for which we contend, and 
that punishment cannot constitutionally be predicated, under the 
theory of prevention, upon a state of facts which, in the exercise 
of a high degree of diligence, could not have been discovered or 
obviated by the effective interposition- of the will of the accused.25 
the vendor * * * or his knowledge of its adulteration, it would thereby have 
defeated its declared purpose." Shauck, J., in State v. Kelly, 54 Oh. St. 
166, 179· 
25 Care must be taken to distinguish between the effect of shifting the 
burden of proof for such a purpose and excluding proof altogether. The 
erection of disputable presumptions to supply evidence which it is difficult 
for the prosecution to produce is inherent in every system of criminal juris-
prudence; thus, every man is presumed to intend the consequences of his 
voluntary act, when "specific intenf' is in issue; every man is presumed 
to be sane; so it is no deviation from principle to make an event prima facie 
proof of the commission of an offense by a defendant having some percep-
tible relation to the event; Adams v. N. Y. (1903), 192 U. S. 585, relied upon 
by Professor Rood in his article criticising State v. Strasburg, cited supra, 
note 12, is of this type; and see 2 W1GMORE, EvmtNCS, §§ 1353, 1354; 2 L. 
R. A. (n. s.) 1007, note. Compare State v. Beswick and State v. Kartz, 
cited s11pra, note II ; Hammond v. State, 78 0. S. 15; and State v. Divine, 
g8 N. C. 778. (The Beswick case is probably wrong, as it belongs in the first.., 
class. See W1GMORE, loc. cit.) 
Ford v. State, 85 Md. 465, 41 L. R. A. 551, cited by Professor Rood, 
though a strong and somewhat questionable decision, is clearly distinguished 
in that the substantive offense therein was having lottery books and slips in 
possession, and the rejected defense was lack of kno\vledge as to the char-
acter of the articles. It is not difficult to support the reasonableness of a 
requirement that one shall ascertain the nature of lottery tickets before 
receiving them in possession. As the court well said (p. 477), "we cannot 
imagine how anyone finding either of them on the street would be induced 
to take it into his possession unless he knew what it was, for it seems to 
be merely a collection of figures and letters so arranged as to be uterly 
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It is also submitted that due process of law requires that the 
standard of diligence shall be within the bounds of human possi-
bility. 26 The courts must determine this question, of course, and 
not the juries, and in so determining they should at all times have a 
sympathetic regard for. the social aims of the legislature. Yet it is 
conceivable that legislatures may transcend the limits of reason, and 
where this occurs the courts should be courageous to declare the 
consequences, however strongly it may be argued that the public 
interest requires the opposite result. 
It has been frequently intimated that the comparative severity 
of the punishment is a factor to be taken into account in deciding 
questions like that under discussion,27 though there are cases in 
unintelligible to anyone not learned in the business." But see the comment 
of the annotator in 4 A. L. R. 1538, 1540, relating to People v. Johnson, 
(1919) 288 Ill. 442. " 
26 See supra, notes 18 and 21. It is often said that the safeguard against 
the occasional injustice which any rational man must concede will be very 
likely to occur if "action at peril" is an unlimited principle is to be found 
in "an appeal to the prosecuting officer, or, in the last resort, to the e.'Cecu-
tive clemency" (John W. May, "Mens Rea," 12 AM. L. REv. 469, 478). 
Many of the cases cited herein contain statements to this effect; e. g., Ford 
v. State, s1ipra, note 25 (see the judgment in Com. v. Mash. (Mass.), 7 Mete. 
472). The ancient practice in cases of "misadventure" may be recalled. 
Are these means of sec1iring justice "dtie process of law"? Compare 
McClain, J., in State v. O'Neil, 147 Ia. 513, 33 L. R. A. (n. s.) 788, 794, and 
Mr. Justice Holmes in Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra, note 24 
27 The power to define crime and impose penalties is not plenary. As 
said by Mr. Justice Brown in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 137, "To justify 
the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must 
appear,-
"First, that the interest of the public generally * * * requires such inter-
ference, and-
"Second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishing 
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon the individual." 
Most of the cases where conviction has to be upheld, where there was 
no mens rea, have been convictions involving reasonable fines. It is one 
thing to impose a fine upon a person for selling adulterated food and another 
thing to pull a man to· death or even in the penitentiary for the same or- a 
similar offense. 
"The nature and extent of the penalty attached to the defenses," says 
Wills, J., in Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168, 177, "may reasonably be 
considered. There is nothing that need shock any man from the payment 
of a small pecuniary penalty by a person who has unwittingly done some-
thing to the public interest.'' "There are other cases," says Channell, in 
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which the materiality of this point has been, at least inferentially, 
denied.28 In this paper no account has thus far_ been taken of this 
(1910) 2 K. B. 55, "where the legislature desiring absolutely to prohibit 
certain things from being done has made the person who infringes the 
statutes liable to punishment at any rate by a penalty, notwithstanding the 
fact that he himself is innocent." Mr. Justice Wright, in Sherras v. DeRut-
zen, (1895) I Q. B. 921, says: "Apart from isolated and extreme cases * * * 
the principal classes of exceptions may perhaps be reduced to three. One 
is a class of acts which, in the language of Lush, J., in Davies v. Harvey, 
L. R. 9 Q. B. 433, are not criminal in any real sense, but are acts which in 
the public interest are prohibited under a penalty." The second comprises 
public nuisances, and the third cases in which, although the proceeding is 
criminal in form, it is really only a summary mode of enforcing a civil 
right." (Quoted with approval in Toppin v. Marcus, (1go8) 2 Ir. R. 423.) 
See also Ry. v. U. S., 220 U. S. 559, 577. 
Sometimes the courts in discussing the necessity of intent distinguish -
between acts mala prohibita:, and acts mala i1~ se. As recently as the case of 
Hays v. Schueler, 107 Kansas 635, the court says: "The distinction between 
offenses of this character (keeping automobile rear lights lighted) and those 
involving conduct 111almn in se, and so necessarily requiring an intent to do 
wrong, is illustrated in the case of State v. Eastman, 6o Kan. 557." In U. 
S. v. Leathers, Federal Cases 15,581, the court says, "where acts are not 
111al111n fa se or infamous, but only wrong because prohibited, criminal intent 
need not be shown.'' Insofar as by 111alum1 in se is not meant crimes calling 
for a specific criminal intent there is no basis for the distinction made in 
these cases. The only difference in these two kinds of crimes, so far as the 
right to punish where there is no intent is concerned, is that in one the 
punishment is likely to be of a far more severe character, as indicated above. 
The clearest expression of the view that the character of the penalty 
marks the limits of the power to punish in the absence of intent is seen in 
People ex: rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms Co. (225 N. Y. 25), where the New 
York Court of Appeals says: "There was power in the legislature to impose 
this stringent penalty and to punish offenders by fine, moderate in amount. 
In this and like cases the duty to make reparations to the state when the 
reparation does not go beyo1uJ the payment of a moderate fine is a reason-
able regulation of the right to do business by proxy. In such matters dif-
ferences of degree are vital. Eve1i a fine may be immoderate. But in s1es-
taining the power to fine we are not to.' be understood as mstaining to al like 
extent the power to illipriso1i. This case does not require us to decide that 
life or liberty may be forfeited without tinge of personal fault." Crane, J., 
in a concurring opinion says: "To this extent I concede that the employer 
is liable irrespective of his knowledge or negligence, but when a1i employer 
111ay be prosecuted as for a crime to which there is affixed a penalty of 
imprisonment for an act which lie caii iii no way prevent, we are stretching 
the law regarding acts 11wla prohibita beyo1uJ its legal limitations.'' 
2s See Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minn., stepra, note 3. 
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question. Indeed, it may be affirmed that all that has been said 
relates to ev~ry case of punishment, however slight. But it is 
believed that the principle of necessity coordinating with that of 
prevention does produce variable results. Just as it has been sug-
gested that civil liability might be justified where punishment might 
be too drastic as a method of the police power, so it may be sub-
mitted that. greater public necessity must be shown to justify the 
punishment of death or that of imprisonment than might be required 
to support a slight fine. This statement is made a~ a proposition 
of constitutional law, and should of course be qualified in the usual 
way by saying that the exercise of the legislature's discretion will 
not be overthrown on slight or even logically persuasive grounds, 
but that a clear conviction of abuse of discretion must lay hold of 
the judicial mind ·before the law will be held unconstitutional 
because of the undue severity of the penalty. 
In approaching the discussion from the historical point of view, 
it has been assumed that the common law invariably annexed the 
element of "intent" to the objective occurrences which it punished 
as crimes. As a necessary result of such an assumption, our prob-
lem is limited to the field of statutory law, and we have dealt 'with 
the constitutional limitations on the power of the legislature to 
reduce the subjective content of crime. It should be stated, how-
ever, that the assumption is not strictly true. The common law 
did predicate punishment upon occurrences devoid of some of the 
elements of "intent" as that term was generally understood. The 
offenses of this class were variously denominated "quasi-crimes" 
and "public torts."29 Though sometimes characterized as not crimes 
at all, save in a procedural sense,80 it is clear that they satisfy our 
29 See classification of offenses adopted by Professor BSA.LE in his "CASES 
ON CRIMIN.AI, LAw." See also note 27, s11pra. 
so See note 27, s11pra., Reg. v. Stephens, L. R. I Q. B. 702; Sherras v. 
De Rutzen, supra., compare Chisholm v. Doulton, 22 Q. B. D. 736, per Field, 
J.; Professor Keedy, op cit., pp. 543-545 inclusive, seems to adopt this view, 
and asks "why should not an insane person pay a pecuniary penalty in such 
cases just as he must pay damag~ for his private torts?" This question, 
it is submitted, evinces failure to appreciate the significance of the punish-
ment embodied in a mere verdict of guilty. See Ballantine, op cit., infra, 
note 34. 
The existence of a real distinction between 111ala in se and mala pro-
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definition of a crime, and must be included within the scope of this 
discussion. And if it should appear that the element of intention-
ality, or the concurrence of the will, as described herein, is absent 
from any of these offenses, the principle laid down by the writers 
would, perhaps, be overthrown; for it may ·be supposed that "due 
process of law" preserves to the individual no greater immunity 
from purposeless and wanton punishment than was accorded to 
him by the later common law.31 No case has been found, however, 
in which a common law conviction for a "public tort" or "quasi 
crime" was sustained as against the defenses outlined in this paper . 
. The closest case is consistent with the principle for which we con-
tend as applied herein to the delegation of duties and prohibitions 
imposed by law.32 
A much more serious question is raised by the state of the law 
in many jurisdictions on the subject of emotional insanity. The 
attempt of an American state to abolish the defense of insanity 
while retaining the definitions of crimes unchanged may be a vio-
lation of the constitutional right of trial by jury.33 With that we 
have nothing to do. We may likewise concede that the mental 
capacity required as the basis of punishability is merely that which 
the particular subjective content of the specific offense requires.3 ,i. 
liibita-between "crimes" and "violations of police regulations"-may be 
admitted without yielding the point contended for herein. There is no 
doubt that some of the possible philosophical bases for punishment are lack-
ing in the case of mere "police regulations." The outrage or "hatred" of 
which Stephen speaks does not characterize the public view of their viola-
tion-though even here the ground is debatable. ('See VoN BAR, "HISTORY 
OF CoNTINENTAI. CRIMIN.AI, LAW" (Continental Legal Hist. Series, Appendix, 
§ 110). The point, however, is that punishment is just as real when imposed 
for one reason as for another. 
31 See Den ex dem Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 
(I855), I8 How. (U. S.) 272. 
32 See cases cited s:epra, notes 27, 30. 
33 State v. Strasburg, 6o Wash. Io6. 
34 See report of committee of American Institute of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, embodying a proposed law providing a test for determining 
criminal responsibility in cases wherein the issue of insanity is raised. The 
report is published in 2 }OURNAI, CRIM. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, 52I, and is 
ably advocated by the chairman of the committee, Professor Edwin R. 
Keedy, in 30 HARV. L. Ri;;v. 535 and' 724 (19I7). A penetrating criticism of 
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We lay on one side, therefore, the question as to whether inability, 
through mental disease or lack of mentality, to distinguish between 
right and wrong as to a particular course of conduct, or sanely 
and normally _to perceive the actual facts surrounding such a course 
of conduct, is material in the case of offenses having the smallest 
possible subjective content, as selling adulterated food.35 We may 
even assume the validity of legislation expressly creating a new 
catalogue of crimes of the insane and the feeble-minded, though 
we are not aware of the existence of any such legislation.36 The 
principle developed herein requires us, however, to question whether 
it is due process of law to punish a man for doing that which he 
cannot refrain from doing, or for omitting to do that which his 
limited mental powers disable him from doing. 
We encounter at once, of course, a question of fact. Is there 
such a thing as volitional insanity or paralysis of the will? Dis-
cussion of this question would be out of place here. It is frequently 
asserted as a fact, however, that such mental states exist. If so, 
what account must the la.w take of them and how does the principle 
for which we contend operate upon them? 
The fear of consequences is doubtless at the bottom of the reluc-
tance of some of the courts to admit volitional insanity as a defense.37 
They have instinctively, and no doubt correctly, surmised that "irre-
sistible impulse" and the like are in most instances despairing and 
it (well founded, it is believed) is made by Professor H. W. Ballantine in 
an address published in 9 JouR. CR. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, 485; see also 
editorial note in 30 HARV. L. REv. 179. 
aG But see Ballantine, op. cit., note 34-
36 The recognition of the principle of "partial responsibility" contended 
for by Mercier, op. cit., note 8, and supported by Keedy, speaking for the 
committee of the American. Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 
would seem to involve some such legislative policy. 
37 Bramwell, B., in Reg. v. Haynes, I F. & F. 666, 667; Rolfe, B., in 
Reg. v. Stokes, 3 C. & K. 185, 188; Brannon, J., in State v. Harrison, 36 W. 
Va. 729, 751; Andrews, J., in Flanagan v. People, .52 N. Y. 467; Gibson, C. 
J., in Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. St. 264; Davis, J., in People v. Cole-
man, I N. Y. Crim. R. I, 3; McGowan, J., in State v. Bundy, 24 S. C. 439, 
445; Valentine, J., in State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205, 212; Sherwood, J., in 
State v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300; Com. v. Rogers (Mass.), 7 Mete. 500; State v. 
Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729; State v. Knight, 95 Me. 467. See BEALE'S CASES, 
p. 463; MIKEi.L's CASES, p. 156; 27 L. R. A. (n. s.) 461, note. 
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flimsy pretexts, without foundation in fact. They have distrusted 
alike the accuracy and probity of expert witnesses, the ability of 
the prosecution to unmask the spurious defense, and the good sense 
of the jury to discern the truth. In short, they have felt the inca-
pacity of the whole system of criminal procedure to produce right 
results in cases of this character. 
But it is impossible to perceive why the danger of a miscarriage 
of justice is any greater, if as great, when volitional insanity is 
recognized, than it is when purely perceptive incapacity is admitted 
as a defense. It is suggested that it is a mere historical accident 
that medical science happened to discover perceptive insanity first.38 
It might easily have happened that the attention of the courts .had 
been first directed toward volitional insanity. In that event the 
"right and wrong test" would have been the radical thing-the 
advanced step. There is nothing more inherently strange or unreal 
to the lay mind in the one type of mental disease than in the other, 
solemn judicial dicta to the contrary notwithstanding. The crim-
inal law has always known and recognized the existence of the will. 
It thus appears ( r) that there is no ground for distinguishing 
between different types of insanity on account of any variation 
among them with respect to the difficulty of refuting spurious 
defenses; and ( 2) that it is doubtful that there is any such wide-
spread and deep-rooted belief, whether erroneous or not, in the 
impossibility of volitional insanity, as has been held to justify legis-
lation, such as compulsory vaccination, etc., based upon popular 
support of one side of a scientific controversy. 
But even if it were possible to brand volitional insanity as a 
peculiarly suspicious defense, and even if one might bring to the 
support of its denial a supposititious popular conviction of its non-
existence, it is submitted that the principle contended for in this 
paper would require its recognition. We have already disposed, 
in a way, of the point respecting the difficulty of refuting defenses. 
At the risk of repetition, it may be added that to say that a man 
can be conclusively presumed to will the motions of his body or 
as The fortuitous character of the opinions in M'Naghten's Case, 10 
Clark & F. 200, and the curious fashion in which the answers of the judges 
to the moot questions propounded by the House of Lords have become 
embedded in our law to a greater or less extent are too well knwn to require 
recital or comment. 
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to will his failure to act is false on its face.39 The only possible 
way of putting the opposing theory so as to display it in its true 
colors is to say that what a man wills or does not will is immaterial 
in the criminal law. This cannot be so, because every possible 
justification for the pains of punishment must find its basis in an 
exercise of the will of the offender. 
Nor can the rule which has been adhered to by the courts of 
some states be sustained on the theory that it merely applies the 
popular belief, and therefore is the law. Constitutional limitations 
protect the one against the many; or they are of no significance 
whatever. True, a public offense may consist of the refusal of the 
individual to yield his point of view to that of the majority, how-
ever erroneous the latter may be.40 So due process of law does 
not entitle one to question the propriety of legislation circumscrib-
ing his own will so as to make its outward manifestations conform 
to the social will. But due process of law does entitle him to object 
with effect to the visitation of punishment upon him for an occur-
rence toward which any wil~ of _his own had no causal relation. 
Again risking repetition, it will not do to seek justification for 
the rule which repudiates the defense of emotional insanity in the 
supposed deterrent effect such a rule will have upon the conduct 
of the normal.41 For, as has been stated, such a principle would 
39 See quotation from State v. Nicolls, 61 Wash. 142, 145, supra, note 6. 
Other instances of this medieval application of the principle of mens rea-
i. e., assuming its universality and then "supplying'' or "presuming" the 
necessary facts in certain cases by a legal fiction-are found in State v. 
McBrayer, 98 N. C. 619, 623-4 (quoting other North Carolina cases). Par-
ticularly, in this jurisdiction, see State v. Brandon, 8 Jones, 463, wherein it is 
said, "if the prisoner !mew that what he did was wrong, the law presumes 
that he had the power to resist it, against all supernatural agencies, and holds 
him amenable to punishment." 
40 E. g., offenses under the compulsory vaccination statutes; or bigamy 
statutes as applied to Mormons; or medical practice acts as applied to Chris-
tian Scientists and non-orthodox "healing'' cults. 
41 "I do not think that it is expedient that a person unable to control 
his conduct should bei the subject of legal punishment. The fear of punish-
ment can never prevent a man from contracting a disease of the brain, or 
prevent that disease from weakening his power of controlling his own actions. 
* * * Such punishments. are not really necessary, or even useful, for the 
protection of society. They cannot by the hypothesis be useful by way of 
example, for I am dealing with the case of those who cannot control their 
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justify the most horrible and outrageous reprisals upon the wholly 
innocent, such as the capital punishment of a whole community of 
negroes for the unspeakable crime of one of them in order to ter-
rorize into peaceability the members of the race generally. The 
line must be drawn somewhere; and it is submitted that, whatever 
be the philosophical basis of punishment, it cannot, with justice, 
be predicated otherwise than upon the rebellious will of its victim. 
If our arguments are sound, the individual in the United States 
has a constitutional immunity from punishment attributed to an 
event not the product of the inharmony of his will with that of the 
state. This being so, the alleged hapless victim of the "irresistible 
impulse" has a constitutional right to go to the jury with proof of 
the existence, the nature and· the subjective effect of his affliction. 
No case has been found, however, in which the constitutional aspect 
of the question has been considered apart from the statute.42 
Care must be taken here to distinguish between "punishment" 
as conceived of herein and other usages to which the state may 
attempt to submit the individual. Reference to the opening para-
graphs of this article will show that there is at least implicit in the 
definition there framed the thought that punishment is the legal 
consequence of an event. It is predicated in necessary part upon 
a happening, a delict. The plea of defense is "not guilty" of the 
crime charged; and the verdict of "guilty" is itself a punishment, 
as it carries the stigma of condemnation with it There may be 
restraints of individuals and possibly even corporal inflictions. 
which are not imposed as punishment at all. Detention in hospitals 
for the insane is referable to the police power, no doubt ;43 but such 
confinement is justified by fear of what the insane person is anti 
may therefore do rather than as a punishment for what he has done. 
The distinction is perfectly familiar; and all questions as to due 
process of law in commitments to such institutions and other legal 
consequences of adjudicated status are outside the scope of this 
article. Mention may be made of one, however, suggested by the 
conduct. To threaten such a man with punishment is like threatening to 
punish a man for not lifting a weight which he cannot move." S'.rEPHSN, 
HIST. CR. L., Ch. XIX, Vol. 2, pp. 171, 172. 
42 See State v. Strasburg, supra, note 33. 
43 FRsuND, Por,1cs PowsR, Ch. X. 
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English statutes relating to criminal procedure where insanity is 
the defense. It is submitted that a verdict of "guilty though insane" 
cannot constitutionally be reached where the insanity is volitional 
in the exact sense; and that wheresoever the consequences which 
the state attempts to attach to such a verdict, or to a verdict of 
acquittal .on grounds of insanity which is volitional, or to an adjudi-
cation of such insanity in case of a prisoner charged with crime, 
is detention in an asylum for life or for any fixed period, regard-
less of the alleviation or cure of his mental disease, such conse-
quence amounts to and is punishment and not custody referable to 
status ; and being such, the imprisonment after a cure is effected 
would be a deprivation of liberty without due proce5s of law.u 
44 State v. Strasburg, supra, note 33 (concurring opinion of Buckin, J., 
p. 130). In re Boyett, 136 N. C. 415, Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. l. 
The English act is known as the "Trial of Lunatics Act" (1883), 46 and 47 
Viet., c. 38. See report of committee of. Institute of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, printed in the }OURNAJ, OF THE INSTITUTE, Vol. 2, Pl>· 521, 530, 
which gives the text of the English statute and several American statutes 
modeled after it (Indiana, Nebraska, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota), together with the proposal of a committee of the New York 
State Bar Association (19rr) framed along similar lines. Some of these 
statutes are believed to be unconstitutional and all of them are rightly criti-
cised by the committee in its report (see p. 531), though not expressly on 
constitutional grounds. It is strange that the reasoning of some of the cases 
cited herein has apparently been overlooked, and the distinction between the 
omnipotence of the British parliament and the limited powers of an Amer-
ican legislature forgotten. See, however, John R. Rood, "Statutory Aboli-
tion of the Defense of Insanity in Criminal Cases," 9 M1cH. L. Rsv. 126, 
wherein. it is contended that State v. Strasburg is unsound, that the English 
act does not deny due process of law in the American constitutional sense, 
and that Underwood v. People and In re Boyette are to be distinguished. 
In some respects Professor Rood's criticisms may possibly be accepted; but 
that the writers must hold that he falls into at least two fundamental errors, 
both discussed in the text of his article, will be apparent from the following 
quotatiom; : 
"Insanity as a defense * * * goes only to the existence of criminal intent. 
And that the legislature may make the doiqg of the prohibited act a crime 
regardless of the intent with which it has been done is a proposition which 
has heretofore been generally admitted. * * *" p. 132 (citing State v. Con-
statine, 43 Wlash. 102, and other "knowledge" cases). This, it is submitted, 
is the familiar error of failing to distinguish between knowledge and voli-
tion. "The defense of insanity is not based on any supposition that the 
insane person does not know what he is doing, but merely that he does not 
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The following conclusions have been reached: 
I. The ancient ma.."'{im, "actus non reiim nisi mens rea," is full 
of meaning and has universal application, if ''actus" be translated 
as "event," "mens" as "will," and "reel' as meaning "exercised in 
disobedience to the command of the law," or "not exercised in obe-
dience to that command when such obedience is possible."45 That 
is to say, there is an invariable principle to the effect that a mere 
event is not a crime on the part of a human being; but crime con-
sists in the opposition of the individual will to the will of the state, 
having perceptible causal connection with a given event. -
.2. "Due process of law" guarantees to the individual immunity 
from punishment on account of that which is not a crime; i. e., an 
event not contributed to by the exercise or non-exercise of his will. 
3. The status of the individual may be affected, and as a result 
know it is wrong because he is laboring under a delusion which produces 
a mistake of fact, causing the act to appear to the insane person innocent. 
He knows what he is doing and intends to do it; but he does not know it 
is wrong, and that is the reason he is excused from liability." 
If this statement were true in fact, as distinguished from being accurate 
in law (as to those jurisditions which deny the volitional test), one would 
have to agree that, like other mistakes of fact, the insane delusion might be 
made immaterial by statute. But few now contend that delusion affecting 
the correctness of perceptions constitutes the full mental effect of even the 
most limited types of insanity. See Mercier, op. cit., note 8, passim. 
45 It is, of course, not contended that the suggested application of the 
maxim is historically correct. We shall be misunderstood if the arguments 
we have employed are interpreted as directed to the point that the above 
translation represents what the first users of the phrase had in mind. On 
the contrary, it is believed that they meant "act" in the e..'Cact sense, and 
"mind" in the sense of "intent"-i. e., perception. See S'J.'ROUD, "MENS REA," 
20; ENDLICH, "THE DoC'J.'RINE oF MENS REA," 13 CR. LAw MAGAZINE, 831, 834 
So it is perfectly correct for the courts to conclude, as they did ultimately 
conclude, that "mens rea" is not an indispensable element of crime-that the 
maxim is not of universal application. Our purpose has been to show that, 
though the maxim itself is not universally true, there is a principle that does 
have universal application; and for purpose of emphasis, it has been thought 
not inappropriate to paraphrase the maxim to secure an apt statement of the 
true principle. The paraphrase is\ therefore, not a more perfect translation 
of what its early users meant, but a statement of what they might better 
have laid down if they had in mind a universal principal. And the theme is 
that when the lack of universality of the maxim was established the courts 
and writers were slow to discover the true universal principle. 
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he may be placed under restraint and, perhaps, suffer physical pain, 
because of what he is; but he can only, consistently with due process 
of law, ·be punished for what he has done or failed to do,-that is, 
for his rebellious conduct; and there can be no conduct without will. 
4. No exception can be made to the application of the principle 
on grounds of expediency, such as (I) the difficulty of refuting a 
defense; ( 2) the more effectual enforcement of a police regula-
tion; nor on the· ground of (3) an overwhelming public opinion to 
the effect that punishment should follow the fact, and the will 
should be ignored as to any particular offense or any particular 
class of circumstances negativing the concurrence of the will. 
5. The fact that the ancient maxim _:was misconceived and applied 
so broadly as to cover such mental states as purpose, knowledge of 
particular facts, knowledge of the law, and ability to distinguish 
between right and wrong, does not justify either its repudiation 
in toto or its non-application to the field of so-called "statutory 
crimes," when it is properly defined. In reality, the principle is 
embodied in the old term "general criminal intent" as distinguished 
from "specific intent," of which these other subjective facts are 
the . elements; and may be expressed by the statement that general 
criminal intent, properly understood, is a necessary element of all 
crimes. 
6. The principle is not disproved by the fact that the common 
law recognized a class of offenses described as "quasi-crimes" or 
, "public torts," because there is no evidence that criminal intent, 
as we have defined it, was absent from such offenses. 
7. "Due process of law" not only imposes upon the police power 
of the state in the creation of crimes the absolute limitation which 
has been pointed out; but requiring as it does (I) that every 
restraint upon the freedom of the individual will and every com-
pulsion exerted upon individual conduct be justified by what strong 
and preponderant public opinion sanctions as necessity, and (2) 
that no more drastic methods of regulating human conduct be 
employed than like necessity justifies, constructs a double addi-
tional limitation which may, in theory at least, and where palpably 
violated on the one score or the other, invalidate criminal legisla-
tion under the guise of that power. (No account is taken of the 
operation of other constitutional limitations, such as those respect-
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ing e.-. post facto laws, the denial of the equal protection ~f the 
laws, etc.) 
8. Due process of law requires that the standard of diligence 
exacted by criminal legislation embodying the principle of "action 
at peril" shall be within the bounds of human possibility, however 
great the strong and preponderant public opinion may deem to be 
the peril against which safeguards are to be created. 
9. The rule prevailing in many states, whereby volitional insanity 
is ignored, and evidence of it withheld from the jury, is a denial 
of due process of law. 
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